CVE-2026-15890: The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module, secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c, stores its nonce counter in unsy
What it means
NIST National Vulnerability Database ha pubblicato CVE-2026-15890. La rilevanza va confermata rispetto alle tecnologie effettivamente in uso.
Why it matters
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Recommended actions
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Translation in progress
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Text acquired from the source
The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module, secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c, stores its nonce counter in unsynchronized function-local static variables (s_nonce and s_nonce_initialized). Every ITS write obtains its AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce here via secure_storage_its_transform_to_store(). Because the function held no lock, two threads calling it concurrently race on the shared statics: the initialization path (psa_generate_random() followed by memcpy()) and the non-atomic increment-then-copy path can each hand the same nonce value to two distinct encryption operations, and can lose increments so the counter repeats values it was designed never to repeat. The ITS layer (secure_storage_its_set() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/implementation.c) performs no serialization of its own, so concurrent same-UID writes reach the racy provider directly. Reusing a nonce with the same key under AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a catastrophic AEAD failure: it leaks the XOR of the two plaintexts (ITS routinely stores secrets, including PSA persistent keys) and, for GCM, exposes the authentication key, enabling forgery of stored entries. Because the AEAD key is derived per entry UID, the security-relevant collision is two concurrent writes to the same UID both receiving the same nonce; an adversary able to read the raw backing storage can then exploit the reuse. Both ITS store back-ends shipped with Zephyr, zms.c and the settings/NVS back-end in settings.c, are log-structured flash stores with deferred garbage collection, so an entry superseded by a rewrite remains physically present in the partition until its sector is reclaimed. Two same-UID writes that race theref
- Source
- NIST National Vulnerability Database
- Publishing entity
- NIST National Vulnerability Database
- Entity type
- National authority
- Area
- North America · US
- Original language
- en · translation in preparation
- Publication
- 22/09/2026 00:16
- CVE
- CVE-2026-15890
- Classification
- Medium
- Stated country
- US
Affected products and versions
The official sources queried do not yet expose a list of affected versions. No automatic inference is made.