CVE-2026-98163
Scheda descrittiva ricevuta da OpenCTI e minimizzata per la consultazione nel portale Intel.
- Condivisione
- PUBLIC-OSINT
- Confidenza
- 100
- Fonte
- The CVE Program
- Aggiornata
- 26/09/2026 14:14
Descrizione
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)
Dettagli tecnici minimizzati
Nessun dato grezzo- cisa kev
- False
Riferimenti pubblici
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/828938118d6c2bb711301748c3e39e4bed6a62f5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/828938118d6c2bb711301748c3e39e4bed6a62f5 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/057dac23d329d5c5ed62352f2659a39fd46c6d4a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/057dac23d329d5c5ed62352f2659a39fd46c6d4a
Catalogo Intel
La vulnerabilità è presente anche nel catalogo editoriale EudorIA.
Apri analisi EudorIALa presenza in OpenCTI descrive una correlazione di intelligence e non costituisce, da sola, prova di compromissione, attribuzione legale o indicazione operativa applicabile senza verifica del contesto.